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The Entrapment Defense - What Hath the Model
Penal Code Wrought?
James T. Ranney*
Entrapment is a rather remarkable and clearly unique defense.'
Unlike defenses ordinarily employed by criminal defendants, en-
trapment does not entail a denial of guilt or responsibility; rather,
it has been said that the defense "concedes the commission of a
criminal offense."' The defendant asserts that he would not have
committed the offense if a government agent had not induced him,
and he hopes thereby to convince the court that the conduct of the
police should cancel his responsibility for the crime.'
Historically, the defense of entrapment has been justified through
theories such as estoppel, statutory construction, and preservation
of judicial integrity.4 Today, however, the defense is essentially
based on considerations of public policy.' The integrity of the crimi-
*B.S., University of Wisconsin; J.D., Harvard Law School; Deputy Chief, Appeals Divi-
sion, Philadelphia District Attorney's Office, 1970-1974; Associate Professor of Law and
Director of Montana Criminal Law Research Center, University of Montana. This article is
an excerpt from the author's two-volume book on criminal law and procedure to be published
in 1978.
1. The entrapment defense was not recognized in this country until just before 1900,
having been regularly rejected prior to that time. See, e.g., Board of Comm'rs v. Backus, 29
How. Pr. 33, 42 (N.Y. 1864) ("[Tlhis plea [entrapment] has never . .. availed to shield
crime . . . and it is safe to say that under any code of civilized ...ethics, it never will.").
It is still rejected as a defense in Great Britain. See generally DeFeo, Entrapment as a Defense
to Criminal Responsibility: Its History, Theory and Application, 1 U.S.F.L. REv. 243, 244-52
(1967) [hereinafter cited as DeFeo]; Isles & Weissbard, Defense of Entrapment, in CRIMINAL
DEFENSE TECHNIQUES § 30.02 (R. Cipes ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Isles & Weissbardj;
Shafer & Sheridan, The Defense of Entrapment, 8 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 277 (1970); Mikell, The
Doctrine of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 245 (1942).
2. Commonwealth v. Jones, 242 Pa. Super. Ct. 303, 312, 363 A.2d 1281, 1285 (1976)
(dictum). But cf. note 41 infra (courts split on whether a defendant can both raise the
entrapment defense and deny his guilt).
3. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10(2), Comment 4 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
4. Cf. Tanford, Entrapment: Guidelines for Counsel and the Courts, 13 CriM. L. BULL. 5,
5-6 (1977) (estoppel, due process, statutory construction, public policy, and preservation of
judicial integrity) [hereinafter cited as Tanford]; DeFeo, supra note 1, at 252-59 (early
Supreme Court entrapment decisions grounded on a novel "innocence" theory based on a very
strained statutory construction reading, at least under majority view); Note, The Defense of
Entrapment: A Plea for Constitutional Standards, 20 U. FLA. L. RPv. 63, 65 nn.14 & 15 (1967).
5. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 242 Pa. Super. Ct. 303, 363 A.2d 1281 (1976) (under
Model Penal Code definition of entrapment, the defense is a kind of super exclusionary rule
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nal justice system will not permit a conviction based on seriously
reprehensible police conduct.'
The elements of entrapment are best explained in terms of either
of two approaches-subjective or objective. The subjective theory of
entrapment focuses on the culpability of the particular defendant,
and the critical question is whether the accused would have com-
mitted the crime without persuasion from the police. If the defen-
dant is found to have been ready to commit the offense, an assertion
of entrapment will fail, even though the state agent used undue
persuasion.7 Before the court will release the defendant, it must
decide that he was led astray by the conduct of the police.8
The objective approach to entrapment judges the actions of the
police rather than the defendant's predisposition towards crime. If
the agent's inducements would have caused a "reasonable man" to
commit the crime, the defendant will be released.' The accused's
intent is irrelevant. Under the objective approach, even a defendant
ready and willing to commit the crime without police inducement
may be acquitted.'0
The inevitable clash between these two views has produced the
so-called "entrapment controversy."" Pennsylvania resolved the
controversy by adopting the generally more liberal objective ap-
proach incorporated in the Model Penal Code.' 2 The Pennsylvania
designed to deter "seriously objectionable police conduct"); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, HAND-
BOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 48, at 372 n.24 (1972) (public policy is "the proper explanation of
the entrapment defense") [hereinafter cited as LAFAVE & SCOTT]; Note, Entrapment, 73
HARV. L. REv. 1333, 1335 (1960) (under subjective definition of entrapment, the defense "must
be attributed to a social judgment that the particular defendant does not deserve to be
punished") [hereinafter cited as Entrapment].
Cases appropriate for a claim of entrapment must be distinguished from those where an
element of the crime, such as reliance upon the defendant's misrepresentation, is lacking. See
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra, § 48 at 370; R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 1031-32 (2d ed. 1969).
6. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 437 (1932).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 437 (1973).
8. See Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REv. 163, 165 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Park].
9. See People v. Benford, 53 Cal. 2d 1, 8-9, 345 P.2d 928, 935 (1959).
10. See Park, supra note 8, at 166.
11. See id. (a thoughtful and, indeed, rather devastating critique of the Model Penal Code
definition of entrapment). Compare id., and DeFeo, supra note 1 (critical of Model Penal
Code), with Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agents
Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Donnelly]; Note, Entrapment
in the Federal Courts: Sixty Years of Frustration, 10 NEW ENG. L. REv. 179 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Entrapment in the Federal Courts]; and Tanford, supra note 4 (lead
articles favoring Model Penal Code test).
12. Some confusion initially surrounded the meaning of the new test. See Commonwealth
Vol. 16: 157
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Crimes Code' 3 provides that a public law enforcement official" or a
person acting in cooperation with such an official'5 perpetrates an
entrapment if, for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commis-
sion of an offense,"6 he induces or encourages another person 7 to
engage in conduct constituting such offense 8 by either: (1) making
knowingly false representations designed to induce the belief that
such conduct is not prohibited'9 or (2) "employing such methods of
persuasion or inducement which create a substantial risk that such
an offense will be committed by persons other than those who are
ready to commit it." 0
The above quoted language is based upon the minority view2'
espoused in three 5-4 landmark decisions of the United States Su-
preme Court. 2 The majority opinions in these cases adopted the
subjective view of entrapment by focusing heavily on the defen-
dant's predisposition to commit the crime. The majority's test for
v. Mott, 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 52, 334 A.2d 771 (1976); Commonwealth v. Proietto, 241 Pa.
Super. Ct. 385, 361 A.2d 712 (1976) (the court thought the new Code provision merely restated
the prior "subjective" standard). The courts now realize that the Code provision adopted the
Model Penal Code "objective" test. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 242 Pa. Super. Ct. 303, 363
A.2d 1281 (1976).
13. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 313 (Purdon 1973) [hereinafter the Pennsylvania Crimes
Code will be referred to as the Code; the Model Penal Code will be referred to as the Model
Penal Code.]
14. See Henderson v. United States, 237 F.2d 169, 175 (5th Cir. 1956). See also Holloway
v. United States, 432 F.2d 775, 776 (10th Cir. 1970); Carbajal-Portillo v. United States, 396
F.2d 944, 947-48 (9th Cir. 1968); see generally Park, supra note 8, at 240-43; LAFAvE & SCorr,
supra note 5, § 48 at 370 n.7; Donnelly, supra note 11, at 1108-09.
15. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, Comment 6 at 23 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) ("When
private individuals or groups become part of law enforcement, through active or passive
cooperation of officials, they must meet the standards appropriate to the officers them-
selves."); Entrapment, supra note 5, at 1341-43 (1960). Cf. State v. Davis, 175 N.W.2d 407
(Iowa 1970) (entrapment does not result from act of inducement by a private citizen).
16. No case law has been found dealing with this limiting language.
17. The use of the words "or encourages" may avoid possible causation problems. See
Park, supra note 8, at 175-76, 210-11.
18. The fact that a person was induced to sell a drug does not necessarily mean that they
were induced to possess the drug. See State v. Smail, 337 So. 2d 421 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
19. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 313(a)(1) (Purdon 1973). Cf. LAFAvE & Scor, supra note
5, § 48 at 372 n.17 (noting that where the government, even unintentionally, misleads a person
into thinking that conduct does not violate the law, the defense of mistake of law may arise).
See also People v. Kaeppel, 74 Misc. 2d 220, 342 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Crim. Ct. 1973); Entrapment
in the Federal Courts, supra note 11, at 220-21 (this provision superfluous).
20. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 313(a)(2) (Purdon 1973).
21. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, Comments 2 & 3 at 16-19 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
22. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369
(1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). See also Hampton v. United States,
425 U.S. 484 (1976).
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entrapment was whether the officer created the criminal design or
merely afforded an opportunity for the commission of an offense by
a person "already disposed to commit the crime." 3
Pennsylvania's present codification of entrapment is derived from
an opinion of Justice Frankfurter:
The crucial question, not easy of answer, to which the court
must direct itself is whether the police conduct revealed in the
particular case falls below standards, to which common feel-
ings respond, for the proper use of governmental power ...
This does not mean that the police may not act so as to
detect those engaged in criminal conduct and ready and willing
to commit further crimes should the occasion arise. Such in-
deed is their obligation. It does mean that in holding out in-
ducements they should act in such a manner as is likely to
induce to the commission of crime only these persons and not
others who would normally avoid crime and through self-
struggle resist ordinary temptations. This test shifts attention
from the record and predisposition of the particular defendant
to the conduct of the police and the likelihood, objectively
considered, that it would entrap only those ready and willing
to commit crime. It is as objective a test as the subject matter
permits .... 24
Although there is little case law dealing with the Model Penal
Code definition of entrapment, it would seem that the basic test is
indeed "not easy of answer."25 Since the objective standard prohib-
23. Commonwealth v. Jones, 242 Pa. Super. Ct. 303, 310, 363 A.2d 1281, 1284 (1976).
24. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 360, 382-84 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, Comment 3 at 18-19 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) (quoting the
above language); Commonwealth v. Jones, 242 Pa. Super. Ct. 303, 311, 363 A.2d 1281, 1285
(1976) (quoting some of above language). For a listing of other states which, either by case
law or statute, at least may have adopted the Model Penal Code definition of entrapment,
see Park, supra note 8, at 167-69 (listing Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa, Michigan, New
Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Texas, and Utah) and Isles & Weissbard, supra note
1, at § 30.06 (several other states are contemplating adoption of Model Penal Code standard,
including California, Maryland, and New Jersey).
25. It is even possible, ironically, that the test is "an unmanageably subjective standard."
See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973) (criticism of due process entrapment-
like defense lower court had adopted prohibiting "over-zealous law enforcement"). See also
Park, supra note 8, at 226-29 (even with time and experience, development of detailed rules
will probably prove difficult).
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its inducements that would pursuade the average, law-abiding citi-
zen to commit a crime, and since it is arguable that such a citizen
could virtually never be pressed into criminal service absent blan-
dishments amounting to outright duress, the police clearly lack
tangible rules to guide their conduct. 6 Furthermore, it would appear
that Justice Frankfurter was mistaken in asserting that the defen-
dant's predisposition to commit the crime is wholly irrelevant and
that all evidence of the defendant's intent should be excluded. A fair
assessment of the propriety of police conduct may not be possible
without consideration of the government agent's knowledge of the
defendant's prior criminal activity. 7 For example, it seems obvious
that a court should allow more persuasive police tactics if their
target is a repeat offender.
The types of inducements prohibited by the Model Penal Code's
objective standard are not subject to detailed breakdown; rather
each case must be decided on its own facts. 8 Clearly, the typical
undercover drug purchase situation does not involve entrapment.'
26. See Park, supra note 8, at 226.
27. See id. at 201-09. See also notes 48-51 and accompanying text infra (admissibility
of defendant's other crimes or other evidence of predisposition).
28. See Park, supra note 8, at 171-76 (summary analysis of Model Penal Code test noting,
inter alia, that the test is probably not based upon the proclivities of the average person, since
to do so would mean that entrapment would hardly ever be found in cases involving serious
offenses). Prior to United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), the federal courts had
developed a number of "quasi-entrapment" defenses which arguably could be used to give
content to the Model Penal Code test. See Park, supra note 8, at 185-90 ("the due process
defense"); id. at 190-95 ("the furnishing-contraband defense"); id. at 195-96 ("the
contingent-fee defense"); id. at 196-98 ("the reasonable suspicion defense"). See also Entrap-
ment in the Federal Courts, supra note 11, at 198-213.
The few cases decided so far under the Model Penal Code test lend some support to the
view that the Model Penal Code test will not actually lead to results markedly different from
prior law. See LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 5, § 48 at 371-72 ("No doubt, however, most cases
would come out the same way in the end whichever view is taken."); Entrapment, supra note
5, at 1335-36 (1960). See, e.g., People v. Joyce, 47 App. Div. 2d 562, 363 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1975)
(no entrapment merely because undercover agent provided transportation to and from the
burglarized house); State v. Baumann, 236 N.W.2d 361 (Iowa 1975) (facts that paid inform-
ant smoked marijuana with defendant, a high school acquaintance, and that sale took place
at informant's apartment did not show entrapment as a matter of law); People v. Turner,
390 Mich. 7, 210 N.W.2d 336 (1973) (despite numerous opportunities, defendant had shown
no predisposition to sell drugs prior to final appeals to sympathy, including appeals by
fictitious addict girlfriend); Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226 (Alaska 1969) (long period of
male agent's ingratiation with female defendant deemed "weak" basis for entrapment claim,
although case remanded). See generally Annot., 62 A.L.R.3d 110 (1975).
29. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 242 Pa. Super. Ct. 303, 363 A.2d 1281 (1976). Cf.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, Comment 2 at 16-17 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) ("Misrepresentation
by a police officer or agent concerning the identity of the purchaser of illegal narcotics is a
Duquesne Law Review
Repeated requests for drugs, however, predicated on the under-
cover agent's supposed suffering, made to a person whom the agent
knew was undergoing treatment for addiction would no doubt be
deemed to create a substantial risk of criminal conduct on the part
of persons other than those ready to commit the crime. 0 Thus, as a
general rule, merely affording opportunities or facilities or other
means for commission of an offense will not lead to a finding of
entrapment.3' But where government agents become thoroughly en-
meshed in serious criminal activity, such conduct may satisfy the
elements of the Model Penal Code's entrapment definition.32
The same rules are applicable when the alleged entrapment is
performed by one who is not a government agent. For example, a
simple contingent-fee arrangement, where the police pay an in-
former to incriminate another, would not appear to create entrap-
ment.13 Some courts, however, do not favor contingent-fee opera-
tions, perceiving an "intolerable" danger that informers might per-
suade innocent persons to commit crimes. 4
THE EXCEPTION
The Code creates an exception to the entrapment defense: govern-
ment agents are permitted to entrap a defendant if causing or
threatening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged, and
practical necessity. . . .An illegal sale of liquor to an undercover agent is conceived and
procured by the agent .. .[y]et some such use of deception is essential to police work in
certain fields.").
30. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958) (unanimous Court, although using
different theories, held that such conduct showed entrapment as a matter of law, both the
minority and majority opinions emphasizing that the agent's conduct was reprehensible
because it caused the defendant to return to a drug habit).
31. See People v. Joyce, 47 App. Div. 2d 562, 363 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1975); State v. Bacon,
319 A.2d 636 (N.H. 1974); Park, supra note 8, at 190-95. See also Hampton v. United States,
425 U.S. 484 (1976) (no due process violation in fact that heroin which defendant sold to
government agents was supplied by a government informer). But see United States v. Russell,
411 U.S. 423, 436-50 (1973) (dissenters would have found entrapment where a government
agent had supplied the defendant with an essential ingredient for drug manufacture which
was difficult to obtain, though legally available).
32. See Entrapment in the Federal Courts, supra note 11, at 198-200 (1974) (noting federal
cases which may have been supplanted by Russell, but which nevertheless may be adopted
by states using the Model Penal Code definition of entrapment).
33. See United States v. Grimes, 438 F.2d 391 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 989 (1971).
See also Park, supra note 8, at 195-96; Entrapment in the Federal Courts, supra note 11, at
203-04.
34. See Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441, 444 (5th Cir. 1962).
Vol. 16: 157
1977-78 The Entrapment Defense
the prosecution is based on conduct causing or threatening such
injury to a person other than the person perpetrating the entrap-
ment .5
DUE PROCESS AS POSSIBLE BASIS FOR DEFENSE
Police conduct inducing commission of a crime may not only
support an entrapment defense, but may rise to the level of a consti-
tutional violation. Government tactics might be so outrageous that
the due process clause would prevent the government from obtain-
ing a conviction even though the defendant was found to be predis-
posed to commit the crime. 31 The Code's rather liberal definition of
the defense, however, could make the due process issue somewhat
moot (except on collateral attack), since any police conduct that is
serious enough to violate due process would surely be classified as
entrapment.37
BURDEN OF PROOF
Under the Code, the burden of proving entrapment is on the
accused. He must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
his conduct occurred in response to the entrapment.38 The constitu-
tionality of this burden of proof provision has been sustained," hav-
35. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 313(c) (Purdon 1973). Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10,
Comment 6 at 23-24 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
36. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973) ("While we may some day
be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous
that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial
processes to obtain a conviction, . . . the instant case [involving sale of a scarce ingredient
to the manufacture of methamphetamine, said ingredient being legal to possess] is distinctly
not of that breed.").
37. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976) (fact that heroin sold to agents
was supplied to predisposed defendant by government informer did not violate due process).
See generally Park, supra note 8, at 185-90; Tanford, supra note 4, at 22-23; LAFAVE & SCOrr,
supra note 5, § 48 at 370 n.2; Entrapment in the Federal Courts, supra note 11, at 205-13;
Note, The Defense of Entrapment: A Plea for Constitutional Standards, 20 U. FLA. L. REv.
63 (1967).
38. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 313(b) (Purdon 1973). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10,
Comment 4 at 20-21 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(2) (Proposed
Official Draft, 1962). See generally Park, supra note 8, at 262-67 (critical of placing burden
on defendant); id. at 175, 210-11 (causation element).
39. Commonwealth v. Jones, 242 Pa. Super. Ct. 303, 363 A.2d 1281 (1976); People v.
Laietta, 30 N.Y.2d 68, 281 N.E.2d 157, cert. denied, 407 U.S. 923 (1972). See Entrapment,
supra note 5, at 1344-45 (1960); Annot., 28 A.L.R. Fed. 767 (1976).
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ing been found justified by the nature of the defense: the defendant
does not deny his guilt, nor does he attempt to excuse or justify his
actions. His defense is a complaint against the state for its imper-
missible law enforcement methods. In effect, he becomes the plain-
tiff and should be forced to prove his case against the state.4"
INCONSISTENT DEFENSES
Although an assertion of entrapment admits guilt, it appears that
Pennsylvania will follow the rapidly emerging trend toward permit-
ting the accused both to raise the entrapment defense and to deny
committing the offense.4' As a matter of strategy, of course, a defen-
dant would be wiser to choose one defense; offering inconsistent
defenses can only destroy his credibility with the trier of fact.
JUDGE AND JURY FUNCTIONS
Although the important issue of whether the question of entrap-
ment should be tried to the court or to the jury was apparently left
unresolved by the Crimes Code itself,42 the Pennsylvania courts
have thus far more or less merely assumed, without even considering
the serious policy arguments pro and con, that the issue of entrap-
40. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, Comment 4 at 20-21 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
41. See United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1975), noted in 1975 UTAH L. REV.
962; People v. Johnston, 47 App. Div. 2d 897, 366 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1975); People v. Perez, 62
Cal. 2d 769, 401 P.2d 934, 44 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1965) (en banc). See generally Groot, The Ser-
pent Beguiled Me and I (Without Scienter) Did Eat-Denial of Crime and the Entrapment
Defense, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 254; Comment, The Assertion of Inconsistent Defenses in Entrap-
ment Cases, 56 IOWA L. REV. 686 (1971); Park, supra note 8, at 257 n.308; Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d
677 (1958).
42. But see S. TOLL, PENNSYLVANIA CRIMES CODE ANNOTATED § 313, at 146 (1974) (argues
that question is to be resolved by the jury merely because a provision providing for trial of
the issue to the court was not enacted); Commonwealth v. Conway, 196 Pa. Super. Ct. 97,
173 A.2d 776 (1961) (under prior criminal code at least, entrapment was jury question). The
courts elsewhere are about evenly divided on this judge-jury issue. Compare People v. Cush-
man, 65 Mich. App. 161, 237 N.W.2d 228 (1975) and Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226 (Alaska
1969) (entrapment a decision for the trial court) with State v. Baumann, 236 N.W.2d 361
(Iowa 1975) (where the evidence is in dispute as to facts or inferences to be drawn, entrapment
is jury question) and People v. Moran, 1 Cal. 3d 755, 463 P.2d 763, 83 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1970).
See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, Comment 5 at 21-22 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) (lists
pros and cons on this issue); Park, supra note 8, at 268-70 (even more extensive analysis of
arguments either way); Entrapment, supra note 5, at 1343-44 (1960) (recommends submission
to jury); DeFeo, supra note 1, at 268-71, 276; Entrapment in the Federal Courts, supra note
11, at 213-15.
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ment is for the jury.43 The objective approach supports arguments
for either view. On the one hand, the final judgment on the repre-
hensible nature of police conduct could be viewed as an altogether
appropriate question for the jury. On the other hand, because the
objective approach focuses on the conduct of the police, it can be
argued that judicial opinion is needed which will not only decide the
case at bar but also set guidelines for the police. In any event, even
if the issue of entrapment is treated as generally being a jury ques-
tion, where the evidence is uncontradicted, undisputed, and shows
entrapment as a matter of law, the court must take the case from
the jury."
SUFFICIENCY OF ENTRAPMENT EVIDENCE TO RAISE JURY ISSUE
Given the fact that the Code's definition of entrapment does not
focus upon the accused's predisposition to commit the offense, vir-
tually any evidence of police inducement is sufficient to raise an
entrapment issue for the jury.45
ADMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR CRIMES EVIDENCE
One of the principle rationales for the adoption of the Model
Penal Code's definition of entrapment was that unduly prejudicial
evidence of the defendant's prior criminal activity, hearsay, and the
like would not be admissible." As previously noted, Justice Frank-
43. Commonwealth v. Mott, 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 52, 334 A.2d 771 (1975) (opinion in sup-
port of affirmance) (citing only pre-Code cases); accord, Commonwealth v. Clawson, 378 A.2d
1008 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) (citing only Mott).
44. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 373 (1958) (government's testimony itself
showed entrapment). See Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 370, 343 A.2d 355
(1975) (dictum). But see Masciale v. United States, 356 U.S. 386 (1958) (jury entitled to
disbelieve defendant's uncontradicted testimony of solicitation). See generally Park, supra
note 8, at 178 n.44; Tanford, supra note 4, at 21 n.73.
45. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). But see Commonwealth v. Mott,
234 Pa. Super. Ct. 52, 334 A.2d 771 (1975) (3-3) (clearly erroneous result, explained in part
by the fact that the entire court mistakenly used the pre-Code definition of entrapment). See
also Tanford, supra note 4, at 19-20 (reviewing federal law on this issue); Park, supra note 8,
at 180-84.
46. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, Comment 3 at 20 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) (rationale
for not focusing upon the accused's predisposition; there is no explicit statement, however,
that such evidence would be absolutely inadmissible); Park, supra note 8, at 201-02. See also
State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375, 381 (Iowa 1974) (subjective test "comes with too much
dangerous baggage of hearsay, suspicion and rumor evidence"); Commonwealth v. Jones, 242
1977-78
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furter, who advocated the objective approach, contended that the
defendant's background should have no bearing on the inquiry be-
cause permissible police activity should not vary according to the
suspicions of the defendant's activities. 7 Ironically, it is probable
that such evidence will be relevant in assessing the wrongfulness of
the police entrapment conduct.48 Although relevant, predisposition
evidence is not necessarily admissible because the prejudicial effect
on the defendant in the eyes of the judge or jury may well outweigh
relevance to the entrapment issue.49
CONCLUSION
It is still too early to see whether Pennsylvania's adoption of the
Model Penal Code's definition of entrapment will yield a significant
shift in the analysis employed or in the results produced. This coun-
try's experience with the somewhat remarkable and clearly unique
"defense" of entrapment has been far from a happy one. There are
substantial indications that this unfortunate situation has been al-
tered very little by the Model Penal Code.
Pa. Super. Ct. 303, 311, 363 A.2d 1281, 1285 (1976) ("the inquiry ... will not be concerned
with the defendant's prior criminal activity or other indicia of a predisposition to commit
crime").
47. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382 (1958).
48. See Park, supra note 8, at 203 ("Sometimes no fair assessment of the decency of an
agent's conduct can be made without considering what the agent knew about the defendant's
propensity for crime [giving examples]. . . . The relevance of the particular defendant's
predisposition to the decency of police conduct is not restricted to situations in which he
displays criminality during negotiations attending the commission of the offense. Prior con-
duct can also be relevant [giving examples]."). Cf. id. at 201-16 (fine exposition of admissi-
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